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DELAMERE AVENUE IN DOWNTOWN NAIROBI

New Political Controversy Stirs Kenya

"The African is determined, through constitutional means, to secure an effective voice in Government. In this there can be no compromise."

Thus, in a letter to the *Manchester Guardian*, 28-year-old Tom Mboya, spokesman for Kenya's first group of elected African parliamentarians*, initiated an appeal to British public opinion this month as the Colony's current constitutional impasse continued unresolved.

The eight African members of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) had formed a united bloc under Mboya's leadership and were standing firm on a demand for 15 more seats on the 60-member Council. The demand would upset the present formula of "parity" whereby European representa-

tives balance the combined total of Asian, Arab and African representatives on the "representative" side of the multi-racial body. The group has refused to accept two available positions on the Council of Ministers, thus "boycotting" the 1954 constitution in-

troduced by the British Colonial Secretary, Oliver Littelton.

An African correspondent wrote from Kenya in mid-June that "the political atmosphere here is very tense."

Mboya's group is asking the British administration to assume responsibility for seeing that Kenya's six million Africans are given "adequate" representation in the Legislative Council. The government has been insisting that the initiative for change must come from the various groups in Kenya rather than from the government itself.

British Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd told the House of Commons last month that the effect of the African proposals "would be to increase African representation nearly threefold and at one jump to bring it up to equality with all other races taken together on the representative side. It is clearly impossible for me to accede to such a unilateral demand."

"My mind is not closed to change,"



AFRICAN youth shows off a prize cabbage at Mau Mau rehabilitation camp—British Information Photo.

*Mboya and his associates were elected in March of this year when 127,000 Africans went to the polls for the first time in the Colony's half-century of British rule. Previously, African representatives, generally men who favored a moderate approach, were appointed by the government.

he said, but until "discussion has taken place and recommendations have been made to me I cannot undertake that any further changes will be made."


One sign of a break in the impasse came last month when Minister of Finance Vasey, a European, said "some increase in African representation is both justified and necessary."

This month, an African correspondent to *Africa Special Report* said the government had agreed to take steps to initiate discussions between the various racial groups, and that Mboya's group had already held one meeting with European representatives, but the meeting "had very little positive outcome." The European group is evidently divided, he reported. "Some want to retain the standstill agreement until 1960. Others agree to changes, but only if any increase in African representation is balanced by a similar increase in European representation. A few believe that concessions made now would offer security in the future—but this group is in a minority. It is now likely that the African members will press the Europeans to make their stand known as soon as possible and carry the campaign overseas to Britain."

According to another African writer, the British administration would be faced with an awkward decision if the discussions break down. The government then would have to act "according to the wishes of the majority of the racial communities (Arab, Indian, Moslem and African) or according to the stand taken by the minority group, the whites. Not to take action until 1960 is, in effect, to recognize the veto (as it were) power of the white minority over political reforms in Kenya."

One observer close to the Kenya scene told *Africa Special Report* that Mboya's strategy is seen in some British quarters as one of trying to bring about an administrative breakdown in the Colony. The idea, supposedly, is that Kenya, now governed with heavy local European participation, would then revert to direct administration by the Colonial Office and would thus be able to proceed in the footsteps of Ghana toward democratic African rule. The London *Economist* has suggested that Mboya may be "reckoning on a period of struggle which will end in him negotiating with an incoming Labor Government in Britain."

In any case, the plan obviously was in conflict with Britain's intended phasing for the development of a per-



manent "multi-racial" pattern in Kenya. Some Britishers warn against an early devolution of power to what is regarded as aggrieved black nationalism and call for a determined British effort to retain European influence as a strong and presumably helpful factor in the economic and

political development of the country.

This view was put into more caustic terms by the weekly newspaper *East Africa and Rhodesia* in commenting on a resolution by a Kenya African student group in the United Kingdom which supported the new African demands. "What can be expected from a rigmarole which begins with the false assertion that 'Kenya is an African country,'" the publication asked. "It is nothing of the sort. It is a multi-racial country, and to treat it as an African state would be to doom it to disaster."

This month, the *New Statesman and Nation* criticized some of the African politicians, observing that they appeared to be competing with each other for leadership "by appealing to mob racialism" and were "playing a dangerous game." The journal added that "every action of the Kenya white settlers over the past 30 years has been calculated to drive the Africans into a mood of black nationalism."

Tape-Recorders Go On When Mboya Speaks

An additional touch of drama was injected into the Kenya scene May 22, when the British administration announced tighter controls on African political meetings and warned that meetings might be tape-recorded "in order to provide an incontestable record of what is said. The Government imposed limitations on numbers in attendance and listed restrictions on African politicians addressing meetings outside their own constituencies."

Two days later, a European police superintendent flicked on a tape recorder as Tom Mboya addressed some 700 Africans at a meeting hall in Nairobi.

Fearful because "inflammatory" speeches appeared to be fanning African opposition to land reforms and disrupting rehabilitation of former Mau Mau still held in detention camps, the Government said it was prepared to deal firmly with any sign of incitement to undermine or defy authority or to threaten security.

The restrictions were initiated after one African political aspirant, Clement Argwings-Kodhek, reportedly told a crowd it might become necessary to resort to "bloodshed."

Denying allegations that he had himself been using irresponsible language, Mboya said in his letter to the *Guardian* that "we are neither prompted by a desire to secure black domination nor do we believe that violence is the means for attaining our

objective." Regarding the restrictions on meetings, he this month told an *Africa Special Report* correspondent that "I feel (they) are to say the least outrageous."

An African correspondent wrote this month that the government had already been keeping tabs on African meetings through police and "Special Branch" informers, so that some Africans suspect the introduction of tape-recordings is a way of gathering statements to be used for prosecution.

The correspondent added that African speakers constantly have been sounding "warnings" in their talks to the effect that "if so and so is not granted, the situation will deteriorate" or "trouble might re-emerge."

He reported that "some Africans, particularly among the Kikuyu, are displeased by the vehement tone of the speeches and are fearful lest they result in a prolonging of Mau Mau emergency regulations. To them, the end of emergency administration is of first-class priority. They want restrictions on their movements removed so that they can look about for employment or carry on trade, and so that literally hundreds of them do not have to spend nights in jails every month for breach of curfew and movement regulations which are so hard to observe. While fond of Mboya personally, they wonder about the advisability of his fiery speeches at this juncture."

African Writer Views Politics Of Post Mau-Mau Kenya, Sees Stepped-up Struggle for Power

In the following article, the current controversy in Kenya is described for *Africa Special Report* by a Kenya African, who asks anonymity. The author looks at Kenya politics from an African point of view and confidently makes some predictions. The article is presented here as a service to readers who wish a better understanding of African thinking at the present stage of Kenya's constitutional development.

By Special Correspondent

NAIROBI

The eight newly elected African members of the Kenya Legislative Council have declared the Lyttelton Plan (Kenya's current constitutional arrangement) "null and void." They all have refused to accept the two ministerial positions set aside for Africans in the Council of Ministers. And they have jointly and publicly demanded that African representatives in the Legislative Council must be increased from eight to twenty-three.

The Governor of Kenya has, on his part, tried to sound equally tough. Despite the "null and void" declaration, he has said that the business of government must and will go on. His recent letter to the African members of the Legislative Council said that if the Africans continued to boycott the Council of Ministers he would use his constitutional powers to fill the positions with Government officials. This he is now doing, at least on a temporary basis. And as to the increasing of African representation, no change will be made unless representatives of all three racial communities (white, Asian and African) agree on what changes should be made.

This is a battle that will not be settled amicably within the country's legislative and deliberative chambers.

The African spokesmen have started to collect funds to send representatives to the Colonial Office and to the British public to present their case. Meanwhile, they are busy discussing strategy with the Indian and Muslim leaders who have already declared publicly their general sympathy with the African stand, though not committing

themselves to the figure of 15 requested by Mboya's group. The outcome of all this remains still unclear. But the Lyttelton Plan—whose continued existence, according to a policy declaration made when it was introduced, depends wholly on participation by representatives of all racial communities in the Council of Ministers—may be doomed.

What is wrong with the Lyttelton Plan? Why do the Africans want it "smashed" rather than wait until 1960 when the next constitutional discussions are scheduled? And why do European leaders, who during their recent elections vehemently attacked it, refuse to join hands with the Africans now for the "smashing" of this constitutional arrangement?

The Lyttelton Plan was a hurriedly fabricated political mechanism in a period of war—the Mau Mau rebellion—and a period of political hysteria particularly on the part of the Mau Mau target, the European settlers. It was designed to give the semblance of a fair deal for the Africans, the Asians and the Europeans. The Plan was to set up a "multi-racial" (as opposed to white supremacist) government whose Council of Ministers would have representatives of the three racial communities.

But to the Africans, many of its features were unsatisfactory. The Council of Ministers, for example, includes four European-settler ministers, two Asian ministers, and two African ministers. (The Lyttelton Plan original-

ly provided for 3 European ministers, 2 Asian ministers and 1 African minister. The present ratio was introduced in 1956). This is in keeping with the Kenya policy of "parity" (i.e. equality of African and Asian members on one side and European members on the other) in the chief councils of state.

Secondly, it was a "standstill" arrangement. No significant political changes, e.g. representation, the voting system, and composition of either the Legislative Council or the Council of Ministers, were to take place unless agreed upon by all racial communities. Since, in the current Kenya political climate, agreement between African elected members and the settlers' elected members is most unlikely, no political reforms can take place. Only in 1960, the year in which the next constitutional discussions are scheduled, may this proviso be waived.

Finally, the term *multi-racialism*, which is the professed ideal of the Plan, is conveniently so vague that it can accommodate people of all types of political inclinations and motives. Europeans, still claiming that only their community is fit to lead this country, say they support multi-racialism. To them, multi-racialism simply means allowing other racial groups to participate in governmental affairs so long as these occupy *secondary* positions. To Asians, multi-racialism will make sense only when political and social equality is made a part of its philosophic tenets. To the Africans, multi-racialism is a tolerable doctrine so long as it does not stand in their way toward a *democratic self-government* in which the majority of the people—obviously the Africans—run the country. Everyone approves it according to his own definition.

The Mau Mau war is virtually

AFRICAN leader Tom Mboya with AFL-CIO President George Meany. Picture was taken in Washington during Mboya's visit to the United States last fall. Mboya returned to Kenya with a promise of \$35,000 from the AFL-CIO to help build a headquarters for the Kenya Federation of Labor which he heads.



over. The time between now and 1960 is the period of reconstruction. If the Lyttelton Plan is allowed to remain in force until 1960, the Africans, under-represented in the Legislative Council and in the Council of Ministers, will be denied the opportunity of playing a major role in that reconstruction. There is the fear that Europeans, dominating both councils as they do, will utilize their power to entrench themselves in their present position in the Colony's political and economic fabric. Consequently, the Africans want the issue of representation to be decided now. They want "parity" turned right side up, making African members in the Councils at least equal to European and Asian members put together. Obviously, they will get little cooperation from the European community in their attempt to "smash" the Lyttelton Plan.

European opposition to the Plan stems from completely different considerations. A significant portion of the settlers resent Asian entry into the Council of Ministers. These are the ones who look upon Nehru with suspicion and are fearful that he might use the Indians in East Africa to give effect to his strong anti-colonial policy in Africa. They would, therefore, echo the words of a prominent Kenya settler, Col. E. S. Grogan, who would like to "keep the Hindu out of the Citadel" of power. Others fear that ministerial positions for Africans and Asians are a bad omen for European settlement in the colony. Already, an African, under the Lyttelton Plan, has held a Parliamentary Secretaryship in the Ministry of Agriculture. Who knows? The Colonial Office in England might sooner or later allow an African to take the Ministry of Agriculture or the more "dangerous" Ministry of Land and Labour which now, together with Education, is in the hands of a British Senior Civil Servant. The Lyttelton Plan, which introduced this idea of ministerial positions for Africans and Asians, though giving these two groups but a minority of all such positions in the Council, can be a fateful wedge and the European settlers do not like it. In European elections last September a majority of voters endorsed the candidates who strongly criticised the

Plan. But now they would rather hang onto the Plan. It at least gives them the assurance that "leadership" will remain in their hands for some time to come, though, in truth, the Lyttelton Plan is non-committal on this point.

Obviously then, the next two to three years will be years characterized by stepped-up struggle for political paramountcy between the Africans and the Europeans. The trends are in favor of the former though the latter cannot grasp this and refuse to face the world-wide trends against the white man's rule over the non-white in the non-white's own country.

The eight African elected members in the Legislative Council are busy trying to force the issue. They have refused to have any one of them join the Council of Ministers until the composition of the Legislative Council is modified in order to give the Africans more equitable representation. They have sent word to the Governor that they refuse to recognize the proviso that no reforms of constitutional character may take place unless all the three racial groups agree. They are constantly addressing mass meetings in Nairobi and other constituencies and raising what they call "a fighting fund." They are even prepared to resign, *en masse*, from the Legislative Council in order to force a by-election and thus, they hope, receive a re-endorsement of their demands from the African electorate.

The effects of their campaign against the Lyttelton Plan can be seen. The Government, while trying to sound tough and determined to put an end to the tactics which its spokesmen have dubbed "political blackmail," is nevertheless quite disturbed. How long can it ignore the wishes of the African public—whom it recently gave the vote—and yet maintain peace in the country? Government officials wonder. How can it recapture the good will and loyalty of the African public, seriously shaken by the Mau Mau conflict, while constantly being accused by the Africans' own elected leaders of bad faith and opposition to African nationalism? How long is it politically expedient and morally acceptable to

have a supposedly multi-racial Council of Ministers functioning without African participation in its deliberations? A Government which has seen the depth of African hate of white man's rule during the last four years of Mau Mauism, must be nervous when faced with a new African nationalist challenge.

Matters are not made easier for the Government when Indian, Muslim and Arab spokesmen publicly come out in favor of increased African representation as demanded by the African elected members. Asian leaders have issued communiques to the effect that they are in favor of increased African members in the Council without accompanying increases for the European and Asian communities. The Lyttelton Plan provided that such reforms will come about only if all the racial communities agree to them. Where has reform ever received unanimous support from all groups in the body-politic, the African asks. If the African and Asian communities, through their duly elected members, want the reforms, and only the European reject them, the Government will be put in a ticklish position. If it ignores the clarion call for these reforms, the charge that the Government of Kenya, and the ultimate authority, the British Parliament, govern Kenya primarily according to the wishes of the European community resident in the colony, will tend to stick. This is exactly what these two Governments most dislike being accused of since they have sought to popularize the ideal of multi-racialism. It appears, therefore, that if the Africans, helped by the Asians, continue to exert pressure for the demands they have stated, they will succeed.

However, they will have to struggle under some serious handicaps. First, Mau Mau emergency regulations continue to ban African political organizations beyond the district level. As all African electoral constituencies, except Nairobi, consist of several districts, this means that not even constituency-wide political organizations are allowed to back up the African members. And without a well-organized, well-coordinated, territory-wide political union, anti-colonialism or any national struggle

KENYA COUNTRYSIDE



COMPOSITION OF KENYA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

OFFICIAL

1	Governor
1	Speaker
8	Ex-Officio Ministers
18	Nominated (Appointed) Members
28	

Total Membership: 60

UNOFFICIAL or REPRESENTATIVE

16	Europeans (14 elected, 2 appointed)
8	Africans (elected)*
6	Asians (2 Moslems, 4 non-Moslems, all elected)
2	Arabs (1 elected, 1 nominated)
32	

* The Africans are demanding 15 additional elected members.

gle for freedom is robbed of much of its effectiveness. Secondly, Kenya does not, as yet, have a truly African press. European-owned "Baraza," a Swahili newspaper, and the "East African Standard," also European-owned cannot be the best instruments for fanning the nationalist fire in the hearts of the African. Nor are these two papers likely to treat the African demands for increased African representation in the councils of state sympathetically. Editorials in the *East African Standard*, which also supplies the local radio station with "Local News," have already taken the African members of the Legislative Council to task. Many of the African newspapers which thrived prior to the outbreak of the Mau Mau rebellion were suspended by the Government, and none of them has been able to start re-publishing. This is perhaps the most serious handicap of all. Without a public media for political education, other than occasional mass meetings, or a vehicle for freedom movement propaganda, it is most difficult to carry on a nationalist struggle. And then there is the sad fact that the current African political leaders, as a group, have not as yet developed a consistent, positive, and inspiring goal or program or ideal with which to fire the emotions of the masses and appeal, at the same time, to the considered and rational philosophy of the educated class.

This is not to say that the Africans of Kenya do not know what they want. Far from it. The recent elections showed conclusively that there is a definite area of agreement among the African electorate in this colony. The manifestos issued by the thirty-seven candidates who stood (people "stand" here for an elective office; they do not "run" for it) for the eight African seats in the Legislative Council showed a high degree of agreement on such basic questions as the nature of Kenya's eventual self-government, land distribution, race relations, the voting system and tribalism. It was obvious that they want Kenya, when it attains self-government, to be an essentially African-controlled state with the rights of

minority groups, the whites and Asians, guaranteed and safeguarded in the constitution. That was the only form of so-called "multi-racialism" that these candidates would admit, though emphasis on racial cooperation differed. All candidates considered the present land system unfair and undemocratic. Making the expansive White Highlands available to African farmers—perhaps by selecting qualified farmers for this special area—received practically unanimous support. So did policy-statements aiming at abolishing color bar (Jim Crow) in the colony. Opinions differed on whether or not this should be done through legislation. It was generally agreed that the present voting system, which gives extra votes to educated or wealthy Africans, those over forty-five years of age, recipients of a military or civilian medal, or governmental employees with long service, is most unsatisfactory. Not only is such a system based on the archaic political theory that voting is a privilege for a few favored ones, but it also spells injustice because these qualifications are applied only to the African electors. But the most vehement denunciations were spared for attacks on tribalism. "Divide and Rule" and tribalism were pictured to be blood brothers and whoever fanned tribalist parochialism was dubbed pro-imperialist. This wide area of agreement on basic issues is probably the most significant feature of Kenya's politics. Here we have a Colony where the leaders of the most populous community—the one destined to take over the control of the territory—have shown that they all aim at a common future with a commonly supported land and electoral and racial policy. Anyone who says that the Africans do not know what they want, or that political agitation is the creation of a minority of "self-seeking," "power drunk" elite is deceiving himself.

What then is lacking in the Kenya Africans' struggle in this crisis? Politics, like religion, requires a Gospel, a message of hope, a body of beliefs whose realization calls for the kind

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FOLLOWING RECENT CHANGES, the Kenya Legislative Council (LEGCO) consists of a 28-member "official" side and a 32-member "unofficial" or representative side. The "official" side includes, in addition to the Governor and Speaker, ex-officio ministers and "nominated" (appointed) civil servants and representatives of the public. Although the members are not chosen by racial formula, they are, with a few exceptions, Europeans, and the group must vote in support of Government policy on major issues.


Elective representation occurs on the "unofficial" side of LEGCO. Voting to fill the 29 elective positions on this side is by separate racial community with Europeans voting for European members, Asians voting for Asians and qualified Africans voting for Africans, a practice sometimes criticized for encouraging candidates to play up to racial prejudices at campaign time. There are provisions for eight of the elected members—four Europeans, two Africans and two Asians—to serve on the Council of Ministers, in which case they would vote with the "official" side in support of government policy. In the present impasse, none of the Africans has agreed to accept this role.

An important principle on the representative side of LEGCO has been that of "parity," by which the white community in Kenya, although outnumbered 170-1 in a population count, has as many representatives (16) as the African, Asian and Arab communities combined. Africans now have a quota of eight seats, Asians and Arabs together have eight. According to current estimates the European community numbers some 50,000 while the African population is nearly 6,000,000 and Asians and Arabs together total about 150,000.

TREND TOWARD EXTREMISM

An "increasing polarization" in the power struggle within Kenya was described by an American scholar, Dr. Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., of Boston University's African Research and Studies Program, in a talk last September in Washington. Rosberg said extremist ideologies are "likely to gain wider appeal in the future." The local situation suggests a more hardened European political response towards African political aspirations, while the African elite appears to be driven to mobilize the African mass and exploit the possibilities of nationalism. The situation "bodes ill for the development of a stable political community, since in such a political atmosphere a liberal, moderate, middle of the road point of view will find few supporters."

The problem facing the British Government, Dr. Rosberg said, "is to find institutional devices which will arrest the trends towards extremism and channel the struggle for power and the conflict of interests into avenues of peaceful change."



"Deep Sense of Insecurity" Grips Europeans in East Africa As Hostile Movements Grow

(By Special Correspondent)

NAIROBI—However much a few retired Indian Army officers and military men in Kenya may sit in their clubs and deplore the departed days of "gunboat diplomacy," even they are realizing that the threat of force is obsolete as a device of colonial prevalence.

A major turning point was Suez. Now, in the aftermath of the abortive Franco-British operation, Kenya settlers, along with British East Africa's colonial administrators, have been taking fresh stock of the situation, and are finding their position in Africa very different from the years before October 1956.

Particularly, the steadily rising temper of the Arab world against any form of colonialism, even of the more benevolent type, has brought Europeans in East Africa a sense of physical isolation.

Physically isolated from the West, Europeans in Kenya find their security threatened by Arab hostility, African nationalism and the more distant threat of Communism. Some may look to South Africa and the Rhodesias for support.

of devotion that Tom Paine had in mind when he wrote "these are the times that try men's souls." As one examines the utterances of the current political leaders one has the feeling that they are meeting each issue with a specific and often admirable answer; that each problem is supplied with a well-thought-out solution. But one wonders, is there a general philosophy or outlook or a body of principles and ideals that gives these answers and solutions their proper context? Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, Daniel Arap Moi, Bernard Mate, James Nzau Muimi, Ronald Ngala, Laurence Oguda, and Masinde Muliru, the eight leaders now representing Kenya Africans in the Legislative Council, are all united on the issues outlined above; they will not, I believe, give in to any external pressures to break the team they have formed in order to "smash" the Lyttelton Plan, but beyond that they are men of differing political and economic persuasions. Some of them are socialistically inclined, like most of the leaders in colonial or recently colonial countries. Others in the team simply have never given a thought to socialism. But there is the encouraging sign of their attempt to work out a pragmatic, rather than doctrinaire,

social, economic and political "Gospel" for their team, which might prove the wisest course to follow.

They will have to do this quickly, however. Already, a not too pro-African weekly newspaper, the *Sunday Post* of Nairobi, has made the following startling revelation in an editorial:

"efforts are being made locally to break down the apparent unity of the African M.L.C.s (members of the Legislative Council) in their rigid resistance to compromise. A time limit must be set on these efforts, so that failure can be reported to the Colonial Office in time for Mr. Lennox-Boyd to act." (*Sunday Post*, May 12, 1957)

This then is post-Mau Mau Kenya. The Africans, exercising for the first time the right to vote (albeit on a seriously limiting basis) are demanding the next logical thing, equitable representation in governmental bodies. The Europeans, having been forced by events such as the Mau Mau rebellion, anti-white supremacy movements in Britain, and the cumulative effects of international opinion against colonialism, to give up their hopes of a settler-dominated Kenya, are reluctant to give in any further to African demands. At best, they would like a government

such as found in the Central African Federation where there is "partnership" between Europeans and Africans in matters of government with the tacit understanding among the Europeans that they must remain the senior partners. The United Kingdom Government and its agents in the Colony appear bent on postponing the whole issue to 1960. Why they believe that tempers will be more amicable then defies one's imagination.

Without attempting to be the Drew Pearson of East Africa, one may safely make two predictions. First, significant constitutional changes will take place before 1960, and secondly, these changes will eventually lead to the Africans being the senior partners in the Kenya multi-racial body-politic. Their very numerical superiority (approximately 97% of the total population), their determination to seek nothing short of democratic self-government, and the growing aversion in Britain to constitutional arrangements (such as the Central African one and the Lyttelton Plan) which give a facade of political and racial liberalism while in fact perpetuating some forms of white supremacy, make these two predictions most likely to come true.

END.

tion from the West greater than ever before.

Even with the reopening of the Suez Canal, East Africa cannot recover from her deep sense of insecurity. As could be expected, the anxiety is most acute among Kenya's settlers, who are apt to regard themselves as an exposed group in what may soon become the front-line in the struggle of ideologies—Colonialism in its rearguard action against Arab influence, and perhaps also against Communism, while all the time the force of rising African nationalism becomes stronger.

The implications of growing hostility on the part of the Arab world were demonstrated by the Suez crisis. Europeans in East Africa have been shown, for one thing, that by blocking passage through the Suez Canal, Arab nationalists can seriously delay the passage of supplies. The lengthy Cape route from Europe and America is a costly and timewasting alternative.

Settlers in British Colonial Africa also realize their air links with Britain are much less secure than before. Even before the Suez trouble flared up, British airliners ceased using Cairo as a staging point on the Africa route. Other lines are also using alternative airfields in Libya now. But if France

The writer is a European resident in Kenya.

cannot come to some agreement with her North African possessions and Arab unity develops further than at present, a solid wall of Arab countries in North Africa hostile to the Colonial powers could endanger Britain's air links not only with East Africa but with the Rhodesias and the Union. With progressive granting of independence, alternate access through West African routes may also become subject to increasing limitations.

The Europeans in Kenya foresee troubles even closer to home, in the "Horn" of Africa, where latent nationalism among the Somali peoples is stirring feuds that reach towards Kenya's eastern border. The fear in Kenya is that this ferment will be subverted into a major threat by Egyptian agents and propagandists—perhaps with Russian coaching—as Egypt seeks to extend her own influence deeper into Africa. Whatever else transpires in this little-studied part of Africa, Somalia by UN agreement will attain independence in 1960, and already the competition has begun among world

powers to fill the political vacuum thereby created. Contestants in the field, all anxious to have Somalia within their own spheres of influence, include Britain, America, Russia and also Egypt and Italy, while neighboring Ethiopia has interests in part of the territory, at least in terms of self protection if not aggrandizement.

The wooing is taking the form of such things as educational and technical assistance. Both Egypt and Italy have had large numbers of Somali students for higher education and Egypt has also sent a large number of teachers. Somalia, therefore, looking forward to freedom and possible bankruptcy at the same time, finds herself being courted by world powers—not for any oil fields or other latent wealth, but on account of her strategic geographic position at the head of the Red Sea. *Realpolitik*, as well as Nature, abhors a vacuum.

Kenya's Europeans are aware that Egypt, charged by the Bandung Conference with the role of being spearhead in the attack against Colonialism in Africa, is deeply conscious of this "mission" and is devoting considerable energy to carrying out a successful "probe," to describe the operation mildly.

In effect this "probe" is taking the form of an ideological assault, having two prongs. The first, of course, is through the all-powerful link of Islam, by which means Egypt can count on sympathy from Arab peoples right down the Red Sea through the stirring "Horn" of Africa to the Arabs of Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The other prong is, in effect, directed at the Nile Valley, along which Egypt hopes to unite various peoples spreading as far south as the Nilotic races of Uganda and the peoples inhabiting the shores of Lake Victoria. This has not yet made much headway; perhaps it will as Uganda nears the date of her independence, which is still vague.

There are pessimists among the Europeans living in Kenya who see a situation very much graver than this hostile bloc of Arab states and Islamic communities taking their cues from Cairo. They see Egypt serving as a bridgehead, perhaps an unwilling one, for international Communism.

The signs that Communism may be ready to begin its assault upon Africa are not lacking, but so far Communism has made little headway, and even little attempt, except to a slight extent in the countries which are already independent, including Ethiopia and the

Sudan. When the first flush of independence has faded in Somalia after 1960, the Kremlin may well try to exploit conditions there.

East Africa, watching all these developments taking place around her, has every reason to feel uneasy. The changing world of the Middle East demands drastic rethinking in East Africa and much more self-reliance. Viewing their own isolated position, many Europeans living in Kenya seek support nearer at hand than Europe. It is to the other parts of "White Settler Africa" that they now tend to look.

A great number of Europeans in Kenya have faith in co-operation with Africans and Asians on the present basis. But those Europeans who can see no future in the existing policy of multi-racial Government in Kenya are inclined to seek an alternative as an urgent necessity for their own preservation. Some see in the "apartheid" policy of Strijdom's South Africa their salvation, while those who cannot stomach such an extreme think that perhaps the Central African Federation offers hope.

Attractive though a link with the European-dominated Central African Federation might appear to some Kenya settlers, no amount of political ingenuity can overcome the big snag that a vast piece of Africa—Tanganyika—lies in between. Unless Tanganyika also wants such a union, the Kenya settlers' dream will remain in isolation—and neither Tanganyika nor Uganda would even contemplate uniting with the Central African Federation in its present form.

But history has a habit of repeating itself and, at least from the point of view of defense, East Africa appears to be moving more and more toward the orbit of South Africa. It was to South Africa that East Africa looked for military assistance in the 1914-18 war when menaced by Von Lettow Vorbeck and in 1940 South Africa sent an armoured division to Kenya to stem the expected Italian invasion from Ethiopia.

South Africa realizes that her territory, probably more than any other in Africa, is vulnerable to Communist subversion. Already, in its own defensive plan, the Strijdom Government has included the whole of East Africa and the coastline beyond, and is watching just as uncomfortably as the Kenya settlers, while new movements and conflicting ideologies gather strength in various parts of the African continent.

news briefs

- THE CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION's ruling Federal Party suffered a by-election defeat in the Mrewa constituency, Southern Rhodesia, this month when Winston Field, candidate of the rival Dominion Party, defeated Federal candidate Evan Campbell by 152 votes out of 2,608 votes cast. The by-election was watched closely for signposts to European preferences in forthcoming general elections. The Federal Party has been stressing racial partnership as a keystone of the Federation scheme.
- NIGERIA will not achieve independence until 1960 at the earliest but will have regional self-government in the Eastern and Western Regions this year and in the Northern Region in 1959, it was decided this month at the constitutional conference in London. The Federal House of Representatives will be enlarged from 194 to 320 members, a Senate will be created, a Prime Minister will be designated, and country-wide elections will be held in the interim period before independence, the date of which will depend on "the way everything is going." Regional Premiers at the conference expressed "disappointment" at Britain's decision not to set a target date. They had asked for independence in 1959.
- FIRST COPIES of Africa's newest magazine, the Central African Examiner, arrived in the U.S. in mid-June from Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, where it is published every two weeks. Patterned after the London Economist, the magazine features useful reporting and thoughtful writing, both of impressive quality. The 48-page number contained articles of interest to readers abroad as well as to residents of the area. One year subscription: \$10 or \$22.50 by air; half price for six months.

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business notes

- GHANA will have its own shipping service, the "Black Star Line," within a few months, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has announced. Negotiations have been taking place with Zim, the Israeli shipping line, for purchasing and chartering ships.
- THREE AMERICAN FIRMS have united in making a survey of the Volta River development project at their own expense, concentrating on commercial and economic aspects. The Ghana Government has given the group until July 18 to complete the survey and enter into negotiations for full implementation of the project. Companies are Utah Construction Co. of San Francisco, Foreign Construction Association of Houston, Texas, and Winslow, Cohu & Stetson Investment Co. of New York.
- E.E. SCHNELLBACHER of U.S. Commerce Department heads a four-man trade mission which arrived in Pretoria, South Africa, June 1, for a six to eight weeks visit. It is the first trade group the United States has sent to South Africa.
- THE ROBIN SHERWOOD initiated a new tri-monthly passenger service between East Coast United States and Capetown and other African ports when she sailed from Brooklyn, N.Y., June 5. The trip takes 17 days. The Robin Line cargo vessels accommodate 12 passengers.
- THE FIRST TRUCK LINE from Nairobi, Kenya, to Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, recently began operating. It covers more than 700 miles and takes 5 to 6 days each way. Kenya's canned butter, tea, bacon and coffee go to copperbelt towns in return for clothing, textiles and small manufactures.
- STANDARD VACUUM has announced its intention to spend more than \$9 million on plant improvement expansion of refinery facilities at Durban, South Africa. It will increase refinery capacity by 5,000 barrels daily to 25,000 barrels of crude, and install equipment for production of 100 octane gasoline.
- GHANA has been accepted for membership in the International Bank and in the International Monetary Fund, and has been allocated 150 shares of capital stock in each, valued at approximately \$15 million. Ghana also has decided to apply for membership in the International Finance Corp., an affiliate of the Bank.
- THE FEDERATION of Rhodesia and Nyasaland attracted 26 times as much outside capital last year as did South Africa. Figures disclosed by the Federal Treasury show that the net capital inflow into the Federation during 1956 amounted to \$73,181,000. Mr. T. Naude, Union Minister of Finance, estimated in his Budget speech that the net capital inflow into the Union in the past year was only \$2,800,000.